Filtered by vendor Wire
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4 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-41093 | 1 Wire | 1 Wire | 2021-10-12 | 7.5 HIGH | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| Wire is an open source secure messenger. In affected versions if the an attacker gets an old but valid access token they can take over an account by changing the email. This issue has been resolved in version 3.86 which uses a new endpoint which additionally requires an authentication cookie. See wire-ios-sync-engine and wire-ios-transport references. This is the root advisory that pulls the changes together. | |||||
| CVE-2021-41100 | 1 Wire | 1 Wire-server | 2021-10-12 | 7.5 HIGH | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| Wire-server is the backing server for the open source wire secure messaging application. In affected versions it is possible to trigger email address change of a user with only the short-lived session token in the `Authorization` header. As the short-lived token is only meant as means of authentication by the client for less critical requests to the backend, the ability to change the email address with a short-lived token constitutes a privilege escalation attack. Since the attacker can change the password after setting the email address to one that they control, changing the email address can result in an account takeover by the attacker. Short-lived tokens can be requested from the backend by Wire clients using the long lived tokens, after which the long lived tokens can be stored securely, for example on the devices key chain. The short lived tokens can then be used to authenticate the client towards the backend for frequently performed actions such as sending and receiving messages. While short-lived tokens should not be available to an attacker per-se, they are used more often and in the shape of an HTTP header, increasing the risk of exposure to an attacker relative to the long-lived tokens, which are stored and transmitted in cookies. If you are running an on-prem instance and provision all users with SCIM, you are not affected by this issue (changing email is blocked for SCIM users). SAML single-sign-on is unaffected by this issue, and behaves identically before and after this update. The reason is that the email address used as SAML NameID is stored in a different location in the databse from the one used to contact the user outside wire. Version 2021-08-16 and later provide a new end-point that requires both the long-lived client cookie and `Authorization` header. The old end-point has been removed. If you are running an on-prem instance with at least some of the users invited or provisioned via SAML SSO and you cannot update then you can block `/self/email` on nginz (or in any other proxies or firewalls you may have set up). You don't need to discriminate by verb: `/self/email` only accepts `PUT` and `DELETE`, and `DELETE` is almost never used. | |||||
| CVE-2021-21382 | 1 Wire | 1 Restund | 2021-06-29 | 5.5 MEDIUM | 9.6 CRITICAL |
| Restund is an open source NAT traversal server. The restund TURN server can be instructed to open a relay to the loopback address range. This allows you to reach any other service running on localhost which you might consider private. In the configuration that we ship (https://github.com/wireapp/ansible-restund/blob/master/templates/restund.conf.j2#L40-L43) the `status` interface of restund is enabled and is listening on `127.0.0.1`.The `status` interface allows users to issue administrative commands to `restund` like listing open relays or draining connections. It would be possible for an attacker to contact the status interface and issue administrative commands by setting `XOR-PEER-ADDRESS` to `127.0.0.1:{{restund_udp_status_port}}` when opening a TURN channel. We now explicitly disallow relaying to loopback addresses, 'any' addresses, link local addresses, and the broadcast address. As a workaround disable the `status` module in your restund configuration. However there might still be other services running on `127.0.0.0/8` that you do not want to have exposed. The `turn` module can be disabled. Restund will still perform STUN and this might already be enough for initiating calls in your environments. TURN is only used as a last resort when other NAT traversal options do not work. One should also make sure that the TURN server is set up with firewall rules so that it cannot relay to other addresses that you don't want the TURN server to relay to. For example other services in the same VPC where the TURN server is running. Ideally TURN servers should be deployed in an isolated fashion where they can only reach what they need to reach to perform their task of assisting NAT-traversal. | |||||
| CVE-2020-27853 | 1 Wire | 3 Wire, Wire - Audio\, Video\, And Signaling, Wire Secure Messenger | 2020-12-07 | 7.5 HIGH | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| Wire before 2020-10-16 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a format string. This affects Wire AVS (Audio, Video, and Signaling) 5.3 through 6.x before 6.4, the Wire Secure Messenger application before 3.49.918 for Android, and the Wire Secure Messenger application before 3.61 for iOS. This occurs via the value parameter to sdp_media_set_lattr in peerflow/sdp.c. | |||||